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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, e-voting is used in more and more countries 
and in all kind of elections. There’s not a single solution 
to e-voting and each has different characteristics and areas 
of application. In this article we give a brief description of 
what we understand by e-voting systems and we introdu-
ce the different models used in remote electronic voting. 
We explain how these systems work and give some ideas 
of their advantages and drawbacks. Finally we give some 
examples of elections using e-voting and some ideas of the 
challenges that researchers try to overcome.
1. WHAT IS E-VOTING?
There are several definitions about what we call “e-vo-
ting”. In a broad sense, “e-voting” is considered the in-
troduction of electronic systems in an electoral process, 
without discerning if they take part in the electoral roll, in 
making the district maps, in the electoral logistics, in the 
mechanisms of voting or in the count and transmission of 
the results. However, in this article we will only focus on 
two areas of application: the emission of the votes and the 
subsequent count of them.
There is not a unique way to implement an e-voting 
system. In fact, there are three types of implementations, 
which basically differ in their benefits and risks. These 
types are listed below:
A) Optical Mark Recognition (OMR): systems of automa-
tic count of votes by using techniques of optical recognition, 
which can read marks in the ballots made by the voters. 
These systems are focused on the count.
B) Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Sys-
tem: systems that use digital mechanisms for selecting 
the vote, such as buttons or a tactile screen. Normally it 
prevents errors made by the voters because it guides the 
user step by step. Commonly the votes are registered by 
the machine but there are some versions that also print 
a ballot to be placed in a ballot box, usually to check 
correctness of the election.
Figure	1.	A	DRE	machine.
C) Remote Electronic Voting System: there are some di-
fferent channels to transmit a vote in a remote way such as 
Internet (web or e-mail), SMS and others. This kind of sys-
tems is more complex than the in-person ones because the 
electoral authority cannot control all the steps as before.
2. PROS AND CONS OF E-VOTING
It’s clear that e-voting can be an improvement on traditio-
nal elections for its different features: speed, accessibility, 
error prevention (which implies a reduction of invalid vo-
tes), cost reduction and the possibility that voters verify the 
correct treatment of their votes.
Even more, e-voting can reduce the cost of large scale 
elections: there will be one paper ballot per voter (or even 
no paper ballots at all), in contrast to traditional elections 
where lots of paper ballots are printed, more than the po-
pulation who can vote. 
In spite of the improvements that e-voting presents, there 
are some vulnerabilities of e-voting systems that have sto-
pped the extensive use of them. For instance, the virtual 
nature of the ballots makes that they can be added, manipu-
lated or deleted. Another factor is that the systems used may 
have problems and errors, compromising voter privacy.
To mitigate these risks cryptographic protocols need to be 
used along with software auditions. With the second ones 
we can ensure that the system works as intended, with the 
first ones we can ensure the following requirements: vote 
integrity, authentication and privacy of voters, accuracy of 
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election results and prevention of coercion and vote-selling. 
Even more, we can also make that individual voters can ve-
rify their own vote and the correctness of the result.
3. ELECTRONIC VOTING PROTOCOLS
Now we will present the electronic voting protocols that 
use advanced cryptographic techniques to fulfill the requi-
rements listed above. These protocols can be classified by 
the stage in which the voter anonymity is protected:
• Before the voting process:
- Pre-encrypted		ballots  (also  known  as  pollsterless): the 
voting options  (e.g. candidates)  are  pre-encrypted  genera-
ting  unique individual ballots for each voter.
• During the voting process:
- Two-agencies	model: it uses a technique called blind sig-
nature in order to split the authentication of the vote from 
the casting of the (validated) vote.
• After the voting process:
- Mixing	model: votes are shuffled secretly and, at the end 
of the election, decrypted, to break any correlation between 
the encrypted votes and the decrypted ones.
- Homomorphic	model: its objective is to obtain the tally 
of the elections without decrypting any single vote.
4. PRE-ENCRYPTED BALLOTS
A problem that can arise when using remote electronic 
voting is that the software used for voting turns malicious. 
In this way, an intruder could see someone’s vote and even 
send a different vote to the election server, thus breaking 
privacy and vote integrity.
In 2002, California Internet Voting Task Force and 
Oppliger presented a solution to that problem: start ma-
king use of code sheets (currently known as pre-encryp-
ted ballots). These code sheets contain a voter identi-
fier and codes related to the voting options (each one of 
these options has a code associated) and, basically, the 
idea is to deliver a unique code sheet to every voter. The 
voter will make his selection by introducing the code 
associated to the alternative he wants to vote for. This 
way, as nobody except the voter knows the relation bet-
ween codes and candidates, malicious software won’t be 
able to manipulate the vote.
Figure	2.	One	example	of	a	code	sheet.
One consequence of not having to compute any encryption 
is that votes may be cast from devices with low computing 
power, such as sending an SMS from a mobile phone.
As we can see in the picture above, there are some return 
codes: these are to verify that the voting server has received 
his vote properly. This helps to counter software malfunc-
tion or attacks on the voter. One example of an attack is the 
following: when the voter casts the first vote and every time 
he casts the same vote the attacker denies the communica-
tion between the voter and the voting server. The voter may 
then send another code (to check if the system works) and 
the attacker would permit the communication, so finally the 
voter isn’t voting what he wanted to vote. Using return co-
des this attack is countered because the voter will know if 
he is receiving a denial of service attack.
All the codes are generated using cryptographic and co-
ding tools and a different ballot will then be secretly sent to 
each voter. So this is the main drawback of the system: we 
need to deliver the vote in a secure way and there can be 
logistics problems when distributing the ballots.
5. TWO AGENCIES MODEL
One of the requirements of e-voting is voters’ privacy, but 
we need to authenticate them. One way to make both things 
compatible is to split voters’ authentication from the ballot 
casting process to prevent the association between the voter 
and the vote.  To achieve this, the scheme needs to use two 
different systems.
On one hand, the validation server authenticates the voters 
and validates the votes in an anonymous way. On the other, 
the voting server receives the validated votes without iden-
tifying the voter and stores the votes. Normally, this kind of 
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schemes are based on protocols that use a mechanism called 
blind signature in order to validate votes without compro-
mising the voter privacy.
The first blind signature protocol was designed by David 
Chaum in 1982. It allows someone to obtain a message sig-
ned by another entity without revealing the message con-
tents to the entity. We require that this signature is able to be 
verified by others (so it’s a signature), like the regular digital 
signatures, and we also require that whoever has signed the 
message must not be able to guess the message contents (so 
we call it blind). 
The voting system works as follows: the voter encrypts 
his vote with the public key of the voting server, blinds the 
message and sends it to the validation server. The validation 
server will sign the message and the voter will be able to un-
blind the message and send it to the voting server, who will 
check the signature, store the vote and finally decrypt all the 
votes. To clarify it, we present a diagram of the scheme.
In the figure, Es(m), Dp(m) and Ss(m) stand for encryption 
using the secret key s, decryption using the public key p and 
signature using the secret key s, respectively. (Recall that, 
in asymmetric encryption, a pair of keys {public key, secret 
key} are used; the first one used to encrypt and the second 
one to decrypt or make a signature on a message. Decryp-
tion and signing are two processes which are usually the 
same mathematic function).
Figure	3.	A	two-agencies	protocol	scheme.
Some issues have to be addressed, though. This system 
breaks the correlation between signature and voting pro-
cess, so we need to ensure that nobody can monitor both 
channels and associate the voter with its vote. Even more, 
the two trusted authorities may be corrupt, so we must use 
techniques of secret sharing (for the decryption key) and 
multiparty computation (for the signature). Finally, nobody 
should be able to vote twice with the same signed message, 
we can use some cryptographic techniques to avoid this too.
6. MIXING MODEL
Taking another approach to ensure voter’s privacy, we 
could think what happens in traditional elections: when a 
vote is casted it goes into an urn and when votes are coun-
ted there’s no way to know the relation between a vote and 
the voter who cast it because shuffling the urn breaks any 
correlation between the vote and the voter. This model tries 
to emulate this behavior.
Actually, this model doesn’t come from e-voting. It was 
conceived to guarantee user anonymity when sending off 
emails but it has been proved that it can also be applied to 
electronic voting for the same purpose, guarantee voters’ 
anonymity. In this system we create an anonymous commu-
nication channel that will break the correlation between the 
incoming and outcoming messages.
In mix-nets (a particular case of mixing model) the chan-
nel consists of some servers, which are known as mix ser-
vers. The first of these servers receives several messages 
from different senders and applies some sort of transfor-
mation on them. Afterwards transformed messages are shu-
ffled randomly and sent to the next server. This one and 
every remaining server will repeat the same process, deli-
vering messages once more transformed and shuffled to the 
server that follows them. The reason for not using just one 
server is that if the server cheats then anonymity is broken.
The messages’ transformation can be of two types, which 
define two types of mixing: decryption mixing and re-en-
cryption mixing. In the first one each mix server decrypts 
the message that it receives with its private key, so the user 
has to encrypt the message as many times as the number 
of servers in the mix-net and a pair of keys must be crea-
ted for each server. In re-encryption mixing the server just 
encrypts the message once and each server re-encrypts the 
message, all encryptions using the key of the recipient. The 
receiver will then decrypt the message once if a homomor-
phic cipher is used (which we will explain later).
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Figure	4.	A	decryption	mix-net.
The main problem of this model is that verifiability by 
individual voters has to use techniques such as proofs of 
knowledge (this is, an interactive protocol where the pro-
ver convinces a verifier that he knows some values without 
revealing them), which are computationally expensive.
7. HOMOMORPHIC MODEL 
The last model we will talk about involves more cryptographic 
tools than the other does, which makes it an expensive model in 
terms of computational power. Using this scheme we can ob-
tain a high level of security and a good verifiability by indivi-
dual voters. As said in the introduction, in this model only the 
tally is decrypted, while individual votes are kept encrypted. 
Before explaining this model we should introduce two con-
cepts: homomorphic ciphers and secret sharing schemes.
We speak of homomorphic	ciphers when one can perform 
some specific algebraic operation on the plaintext by perfor-
ming a (possibly different) algebraic operation on the cipher-
text. For example: multiplying two ciphertext will give us the 
encryption of the sum of the plaintexts. While this characte-
ristic isn’t desirable in data transmission because homomor-
phic encryptions are malleable, it’s very interesting in e-voting 
schemes. An example of homomorphic cipher is ElGamal.
Homomorphic ciphers are used in the following way: each voter 
encrypts its vote and publishes it. When all votes are published 
everybody can compute the encryption of the tally by multiplying 
the ciphertexts (which will bring to the sum of the plaintexts, 
this is, the votes). Later we will show how to decrypt the tally.
Another concept we should introduce is secret sharing 
schemes. The main idea is divide a secret s into n pieces, 
called shares. We distribute the shares among n users and 
the scheme is made so that a subset can recover the secret if 
its members collaborate but a non-authorized subset won’t 
learn anything about the secret. One of the first secret sha-
ring schemes was introduced by Shamir in 1979 and it’s a 
threshold secret sharing scheme. That is, a set is able to re-
construct the key if and only if it consists of more than t 
people, where t is the threshold specified.
Figure	5.	2	points	don’t	determine	a	parabola.
The main idea behind Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is po-
lynomial interpolation. We know that a polynomial of degree 
t is determined by t +1 points, so we can give an evaluation of 
the polynomial to each participant in the secret sharing. When 
more than t people want to get the secret they can interpola-
te the polynomial which hides the secret but t people or less 
won’t have any idea of what polynomial is used. This is useful 
when you need to trust some people and you consider that it’s 
improbable that a large group of people will collude and cheat.
Now we can sketch how the system works. First of 
all the keys and the shared secret are generated, whi-
ch can be done by a trusted third party (TTP) or by all 
the authorities jointly (using multiparty computation). 
The voters will then encrypt their vote and publish it. 
When all votes are cast, each authority will compu-
te the encryption of the tally (multiplying the encryp-
ted votes) and will publish their partial decryption with 
their share of the secret. After that everybody can com-
pute the decrypted tally with the partial decryptions.
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Due to the homomorphic properties in this system, we have 
to check that nobody cheats. For example, a voter could give 
100 votes to a candidate (which would add 100 votes to the 
tally) so we have to avoid this using proofs of knowledge. The 
same goes for the partial decryptions: we have to make sure 
that they are done correctly (again, with proofs of knowled-
ge). This means that the computational power needed in this 
system is higher than in other cases, even for the voters.
8. REAL EXPERIENCES AROUND 
THE WORLD
There have been electronic elections in lots of countries. 
Most times these were just non-binding tests, because there 
was no legislation going over it or just to check if the system 
worked properly.
In the election to the parliament of Catalonia there was a 
non-binding pilot test, the first in Spain when speaking of 
public elections. This was made to test advantages, usabi-
lity and reliability of this technology. It has also been used 
in non-governmental elections in Catalonia. One example 
was the election of the labor union of the autonomic police, 
where e-voting was used successfully.
We can’t speak of more experiences in our country because 
e-voting is still in a very initial state. However in other pla-
ces there are lots of experiences and problems related to it.
In Brazil, for example, all votes are cast by electronic vo-
ting machines. Use of electronic voting technology was au-
thorized in 1996 in the municipal elections. In 1998 this use 
was extended when 57% of the electorate used electronic 
voting. By 2000 Brazilian government had converted to fu-
lly electronic voting and deployed over 400.000 kiosk-style 
machines in elections that year.
An interesting example of how things, if they aren’t done 
properly, won’t work is Netherlands.  Voting machines were 
introduced there in 1965, with a good acceptance. In 2006 
voters from abroad used Internet to vote, and there were 
plans to use internet for voters within country. But legis-
lation wasn’t as hard as it should have been and machines 
weren’t updated with regard to security provisions. An or-
ganization against e-voting appealed that the system was 
easy to hack and six weeks before parliamentary elections in 
November 2006 they proved that they could manipulate the 
machines and they could read them from distance (thanks 
to Tempest). Needless to say, Internet voting was discarded 
and classic voting systems were recovered.
But with no doubt, the place where there have been more 
experiences (and also more problems) is America. On No-
vember 4, 2003 in Fairfax County, Virginia machines mal-
functioned and collapsed the modems. When 953 voting 
machines tried to call simultaneously to inform of the re-
sults they caused a denial of service accident in the elec-
tion. Another example: on August 1, 2001 in the Brennan 
Center at New York University Law School. NY University 
Law School released a report with more than 60 examples 
of e-voting machine failures in 26 states in 2004 and 2006. 
Examples included Spanish language ballots that were cast 
by voters but not counted in Sacramento in 2004.
In fact, this kind of problems discourages lots of voters, 
who won’t have confidence on this system for many years. 
For that reason it is important that, when implementing e-
voting systems, this is done slowly and carefully to ensure 
the security of e-voting. There’s a need to legislate e-voting 
with all the details to prevent fraud and malfunctioning of 
e-voting systems.
9. CURRENT RESEARCH ON E-VOTING
E-voting isn’t a closed topic: there’re still several factors 
that can be improved.
One of the research objectives is to reduce computational 
cost on e-voting solutions. This is very important mostly on 
the homomorphic model as the cost of its protocols is high. 
For example, there’s research on validity check, the main 
efficiency bottleneck that limits the application of this kind 
of e-voting. There are proposed solutions making validity 
highly efficiency.
Another example is research done in mixing models or 
shuffling models. There’re some papers proposing new shu-
ffling systems trying to speed up the whole process while 
still having universal verifiability. Another goal is to make 
proofs of knowledge to the mixing servers in such way that 
the computational cost is reduced. As an example, B. Sho-
enmakers and others proposed a protocol using the DFT to 
have efficient proofs of knowledge.
Apart from research done by universities there also exist 
some companies that research and provide solutions to be 
applied in e-voting. One example in Catalonia is Scytl, crea-
ted in 2001 as a spin-off from UAB students. It offers so-
lutions for e-voting with several applications that go from 
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government elections to college elections. Scytl works for 
the Generalitat de Catalunya, the Ministry of Justice of UK 
and many others. It also collaborates with universities from 
Catalonia in their research such as UAB or UPC.
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